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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Navy ships need to have regular software updates to ensure their 
cyber security posture is sound and to ensure their sailors have what they need to 
defend the ship against any attack. Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme 
Division (NSWC PHD) wants to find a process to rapidly deploy the software from a 
centralized location to a dispersed fleet. Currently software is hand carried by a team of 
personnel to perform the software upgrades, which takes a lot of time and money to 
execute. 
This project proposed to use a remote deployment system (RDS) process 
and investigated the feasibility of using model-based systems engineering (MBSE). A 
system architecture was created using Cameo. The team researched methods that 
industry currently uses to see what can be adapted for use with the U.S. Navy ships. 
This project scenario investigated software upgrades to the Aegis platform while the 
ship is in port for the proof in concept. 
Monte Carlo simulations and analysis confirmed the feasibility of 
transferring large files over low bandwidth scenarios. A decision model was developed 
to determine which alternative held the most value.  Analysis showed that the RDS 
would be much more beneficial to the command as opposed to the current way of 
conducting business. 
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The Department of the Navy (DoN) has increasing requirements to update combat 
systems (CS) onboard various Navy vessels (Moore 2019). The current process to deliver 
and update the CS software can take weeks depending on ship availability. The objective 
of this project is to develop a process that supports the incremental software upgrades of 
CS on Aegis destroyers and the ensuing certification of the CS with the new software that 
is faster than today’s process. The intent of the new process is to provide a delivery, 
installation, and certification time frame of two to three days, instead of weeks with the 
current system. 
The objective is to develop a process that supports common CS incremental 
capability software updates that is faster than the current process and obtain the necessary 
evidence required to certify the CS. The team will use model-based systems engineering 
(MBSE) to develop the process, develop a configuration management plan (CMP), and 
provide a concept of operations (CONOPS) diagram. Figure 1 shows the high-level 
diagram recommended for the delivering CS software onboard ship.  
 
Figure 1. Recommended Process to Deliver CS Software 
This paper captures the systems engineering (SE) approach to outline a new 
streamlined process to rapidly deploy CS software and obtain the necessary evidence 
required for certification or software version information for the CS. There are many 
different approaches and methods that the industry uses to push software updates to various 
xx 
devices. This paper researched the industry methods and provided feasibility analysis if it 
can be used in the Navy. Overall, using a SE approach and MBSE methods, the 
recommendation is a new process based on feasibility analysis. 
The team followed the Vee model SE process adapted from Buede (2000) and the 
software life cycle technical processes adapted from ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017. This 
project only covered the left side of the Vee model because the objective was to determine 
feasibility of the remote deployment system (RDS), not to realize the system. Literature 
research conducted revolved around a remote software deployment system for both 
commercial and military applications. The team developed the CONOPS of how the RDS 
would deliver CS software packages and maintain configuration management (CM). From 
the CONOPS, the team developed functional and non-functional requirements that the 
RDS would need to satisfy to push software updates and query ships to retrieve current 
software version numbers.  
Using Cameo Enterprise and Innoslate as the prime software tools for the System 
Modeling Language (SysML) models, the team followed the modeling methodology 
adapted from the Practical Guide to SysML by Friedenthal, Moore, and Steiner (2015). 
The team created SysML models to describe the interface between external entities and 
internal subsystems, as well as the how the system behaves based on the CONOPS. The 
SysML models provided a graphical representation of how the RDS will function in an 
operational environment, as well as a means to link defined subsystems to their respective 
requirements. 
Two alternatives for the RDS were analyzed against the current method of 
physically delivering and updated CS software. A decision model, including a value model 
were created. Based upon the analysis, the current system has higher reliability since 
technical personnel are physically onboard installing the data. However, the RDS reduced 
the number of personnel required and the time required to deliver and install the software, 
demonstrating that the RDS the more viable alternative.  
The team used Innoslate to conduct Monte Carlo simulation for the RDS 
transmitting software packages of various sizes and various download speeds. The software 
xxi 
package sizes and download speeds were chosen based on common satellite speeds. From 
the simulation analysis, 68% of the software will be transmitted within one hour and 19 
minutes for the recommended system. Further analysis will need to be conducted for a 
defined range of software packages and bandwidth to acquire a refined estimate of 
transmission time. 
Based on the literature research conducted, the technology exists to establish 
communication between a remote facility and the ship’s network. The team recommends 
further analysis of systems that provide a means to deploy software from a remote location.  
References 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Naval Surface Warfare Center Port Hueneme Division (NSWC PHD) needs a 
process to deliver new software capability to ship CS and support the CS to get certified 
for use. This process will include a RDS to aid in carrying out the process. There is no 
process at NSWC PHD right now that remotely delivers software upgrade capability to the 
CS and support to all the ships. This project will help NSWC PHD standardize a new, 
efficient process of supporting shipboard CS faster than they currently do. 
Figure 1 shows at a high level what the process of pushing CS incremental 
capability and software updates to Navy vessels currently looks like. The software updates 
are generated by developers and then reviewed by stakeholders. Future stakeholders 
include the program office (PO) sponsor, NSWC PHD, and certification authority. 
Currently, there are no stakeholders for this project. Once stakeholder approval is given, 
the files are then sent to a remote location where the file can be sent to the ship to be 
installed. 
Figure 1. High-Level Diagram Showing the Transfer of 




The solution needs to include a process for how shipboard systems will be
accredited through the risk management framework (RMF) authority to operate (ATO) 
process, and certified through other agencies such as the Weapon Systems Explosive Safety 
Review Board (WSERB). Currently, when shipboard CS get upgraded, there are several 
approvals and processes that must be completed under Military Standard (MIL-STD)-882 
Series, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instructions (OPNAVINST) 8020.14 
Series, and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) instruction 8020.6 Series. Ship 
change documents (SCDs) need to be approved, and part of that process is getting approval 
from WSERB. Other guidelines for the SCD process are outlined in technical instructional 
(TI) guidance document TS9090-400A. Approval from the planning yards for the ship 
installation drawings (SIDs) is also necessary, where applicable. The next step is to be put 
on the schedule during the ship’s selected restricted availability (SRA) which is scheduled 
by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) (Aftergood 2020). After the upgrade has been 
installed and verified on the ship by the engineers and technicians, typically there are 
combat system ship qualification trials (CSSQTs) to show CS requirements have been met. 
These CSSQTs are scheduled at-sea events that qualify the entire CS. Land based 
infrastructure also needs to be taken into consideration because once the CS is pushed to 
the ships, support will be needed in case there are issues with the installation, maintaining 
interoperability, and compatibility with existing systems (SEA06L 2019). 
The primary stakeholders are NSWC PHD, the software configuration and 
certification organizations, and the NAVSEA POs for the ships and the CS. Ship’s force 
will receive new software upgrades and support through a RDS. NSWC PHD will be in 
charge of the process to deliver the software capability and the necessary support to certify 
the CS. NSWC PHD will also provide the subject matter experts that provide insight to 
what CS needs to be upgraded and how often the upgrades need to occur, and the project 
managers responsible for the ship’s schedule. The POs will be responsible for providing 
funding. 
3 
B. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The project objective is to develop a process that supports common CS incremental 
capability software updates that is faster than today’s process and obtain the necessary 
evidence for CS certifications. The team will use MBSE to develop the process, develop a 
CMP, and provide a CONOPS diagram. 
C. PROJECT SCOPE 
The scope of this project will be focused on the development of a process to rapidly 
deploy software updates from a centralized location such as the NSWC PHD to a dispersed 
fleet. This process will include delivering software updates to shipboard CS, automatically 
tracking the installation of the software updates, verifying afloat software configurations, 
and providing necessary objective quality evidence to support RMF certifications. 
Processes external to this project will be the development of new system and software 
capabilities, the functions of the POs, and the activities of non-Navy government 
organizations and support contractors.  
For this project, the team used the Aegis Baseline 10 as the common CS. For this 
baseline, there are two types of software updates. The first, major baseline updates, are 
accomplished prior to deployment. The second type of software updates are monthly, 
quarterly, or bi-annual updates for small fixes such as addressing information assurance 
vulnerability alerts (IAVAs). These more frequent software updates are dictated by the 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and can occur as often as every 30 days. 
For this project, we examined the bi-annual, major baseline updates. The scenario for 
addressing the DISA updates will be explored by a future cohort. 
D. CURRENT PROCESS 
The current process for distributing major baseline updates is based on the policy 
established in IEEE/EIA Standard 12207, and is shown in the flow chart depicting the 
process in Figure 2 where the steps taken to update three ships with new software will be 
examined.  In this scenario there are a limited number of installation teams available which 
results in a situation where the fleet’s CS have to be updated in sequential order. 
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Figure 2. Current Process for Delivering Software Updates to 
the Fleet 
In the first step in the current software update process, the software developers send 
the final software updates to the distribution team.  The distribution team then sends the 
software to the installation team. The installation team then needs to schedule time with 
every ship that needs the software update.  The installation team will reach out and schedule 
a time with the crew from Ship #1 for when they are in port, and when they have available 
time for both the software installation and the testing to ensure the system is working 
properly.  Once that is scheduled, the installation team will travel to where the ship is, and 
check in with the Regional Maintenance and Modernization Coordination Office 
(RMMCO).  This step is mandatory prior to starting any software installations to ensure all 
of the approvals and paperwork are in order.  After that they can go to the ship and perform 
a pre-test to check the current CS is operational, install the incremental software update, 
and then perform a test after the installation to ensure the CS works correctly with the new 
software update.  After that the system needs to be scanned by the installation team to show 
the system is secure.  Upon completion of a successful update, the scans are sent off to the 
5 
accreditation team to certify Ship #1.  This process is then repeated for every other ship 
that requires the software update, and typically takes several weeks of planning and 
execution.  It results in a time-consuming process that takes weeks for the update to be 
installed and certified for every ship in the fleet with the same baseline configuration.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the current process to accomplish software updates on CS 
aboard ships in the fleet. The analysis looked at the roles of the stakeholders and their 
involvement in the process. The current process was explained in order to identify 
deficiencies that the new process will attempt to improve or eliminate. The scope of the 
project that will design a new system that will be more efficient in use of time and 
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II. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
The final product for this capstone is a process, so the solution focused on the left 
side of the Vee model. For this project there were four phases. First, the initial research 
phase, then the problem refinement phase, then the analysis of alternatives (AoA) phase, 
which led to the last phase, the final process design. These phases and Vee model are shown 
in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Tailored SE Process. Adapted from Buede (2000). 
A. INITIAL RESEARCH PHASE
The initial research phase started with a literature review, which helped with the
problem definition. It provided insight on how other industries and services are deploying 
software updates with minimal human intervention. The vision owner was consulted to 
clarify the project description, scope, and objective. 
8 
During the initial research phase, the initial system CONOPS, requirements, 
functional hierarchy, and system boundaries were defined. This was done during the initial 
research phase to ensure the scope of the project was defined, and to give a clear direction 
on what is and what is not covered by this capstone. These were refined in the later phases 
of the SE process. 
B. PROBLEM REFINEMENT PHASE
The second phase of the SE process is the problem refinement phase. This is where
a continuation of the literature review and vision owner engagement took place, and 
requirements were refined. Models were developed to show use cases (UCs), parameters, 
and the beginnings of verification and validation (V&V). The system concept definition 
defined functional requirements and functional architecture. Tools such as the Cameo 
Enterprise Architecture were used to create SysML models and diagrams. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES PHASE
During the AoA phase, the CONOPS and mission scenarios were finalized and used
to model the solutions developed in the problem refinement phase. Both the solutions being 
modeled, and the modeling parameters were modified to show a thorough analysis of the 
proposed solutions. Multiple scenarios were simulated, and the recommended solution was 
identified based upon the results of the modeling compared with the measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) and the system requirements. 
D. FINAL PROCESS DESIGN
The last phase of the SE process for this project was the final process design phase.
This is where the recommended solution was identified. The vision owner was re-engaged 
to ensure the solution fits the need for NSWC PHD. After comments from the vision owner 
were adjudicated, the final system requirements and optimal solution were refined. Once 
everything is acceptable to the vision owner, the recommended solution was documented. 
9 
E. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The technical approach explains the reasoning of the methodology, technical path 
and tools used. The technical approach is in the order of problem definition, stakeholder 
analysis, AoA, analysis of interface requirements, system concept definition, architecture 
design, model integrations with external system, simulation with UCs, and risk mitigation 
strategy 
The technical approach started with creating a problem definition, completing a 
literature review, and reaching a system requirements definition. This portion utilized tools 
such as Google Scholar, Dudley Knox Library, and other electronic means for literature 
search.  
In the stakeholder analysis, operational details, requirements, mission profiles, and 
MOEs were defined using feedback from subject matter experts and the vision leader. The 
high-level operational graphic and CONOPS models were generated using Cameo and 
SysML. 
The AoA was based on capability and gap analysis, and feasibility assessment of 
two alternatives. The first alternative is to keep the current process, and the second 
alternative is to remotely provide the updates to the ship while the ship is in port. Each 
alternative was measured with parameters such as bandwidth constraints, the number of 
personnel required to execute the delivery, and the number of days to plan and execute the 
delivery. 
The architecture design used tools such as Cameo, Innoslate or other visual Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) applications. During the architecture design, detailed block 
definition diagrams (BDD), internal block diagrams (IBD), UC diagrams, and sequence, 
activity and state diagrams were generated. 
The risk mitigation strategy described in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 
5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and Department of Defense (DOD) 
acquisition risk management guidelines was used for risk impact analysis, risk matrix 
generation, and various analyses of risk. 
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F. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE  
This paper covers the design portion of the system life cycle as shown in Figure 3. 
Tailored from the left side of the Vee model, the process will include stakeholder needs 
and requirements definition, a CONOPS of the new process, modeling of different 
processes, and V&V of the new process.  
The process created will be used in the operational stage of a CS and ship life cycle. 
The system of interest is the system that delivers the CS software to the ship. In accordance 
with ISO/IEC/IEEE 24748-1:2018, the CS software deployment system will continue to 
support the ship’s life cycle until the ship is decommissioned and goes into the retirement 
portion of the life cycle (2018). The software deployment system interacts with the ship in 
the operational environment with the software generation system, the records management 
system, and the accreditation system. Figure 4 is the system-of-interest diagram adopted 
from ISO/IEC/IEEE 24748-1:2018. 
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Figure 4. System-of-Interest for the RDS 
From the software perspective, ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 contains processes that 
are specific to software. This standard is adopted and aligned to the ISO/IEC/IEEE 
15288:2015, which describes the system life cycle processes not specific to software but 
systems in general. Figure 5 shows the software life cycle processes from ISO/IEC/IEEE 
12207:2017. This paper will cover some of the technical processes and technical 
management processes for the RDS. Future work will be required outside of this paper to 
complete the remaining portions of the technical processes. 
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Figure 5. Software Life Cycle Processes. Adapted from 
ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 (2017). 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the Vee model, tailored from Buede 2000. The project will 
focus on the left side of the Vee model, from problem definition to conceptual system 
design. The system life cycle and technical approach that was used to develop a process 
that supports common CS incremental capability software upgrades was also described. 
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This chapter describes the research related to the project and solution development, 
and the scope of the literature review and the findings related to remote software 
deployment, data transfer, various networks, and certification and accreditation processes. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A literature review was conducted to scope the problem and identify potential 
solutions. The types of literature the team reviewed include academic theses, research 
papers, conference proceedings, Navy doctrine, and other DOD doctrine. In total, the team 
reviewed 15 documents and selected nine to comprise the literature review. The team used 
Google Scholar, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Dudley Knox Library to search for applicable literature.  
Research was conducted in the following general areas: 
• networks currently on the ship 
• remote software upgrade capabilities 
• RMF 
• communication networks used by the commercial sector to deal with 
similar issues 
This research helped to scope and bound the problem and potentially identify some 
solutions and measures.  
B. IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS  
In order to understand the relationships of the systems and the boundaries, the 
following terms were defined and will be used in this capstone project.  
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1. Compile to Combat in 24 Hours  
The Compile to Combat in 24 Hours (C2C24) program was developed by Naval 
Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWARSYSCOM) in 2018. “The concept is 
based on web services, or micro-services, similar to those you would see on your smart 
phone, and use of a new cloud architecture Navy is developing and testing, and fielding 
this capability quickly and securely.” (CHIPS 2018)  
The architecture consisted of four key pillars:  
• Data Standardization 
• Use of shared infrastructure 
• Automating functional and cybersecurity controls testing 
• Use of the Cloud (CHIPS 2018) 
The pilot test was executed with the existing Consolidated Afloat Network 
Enterprise and Services (CANES) shipboard infrastructure on numerous Navy vessels. 
“The pilot demonstrated that the Navy does not need to test, certify and install a new piece 
of hardware every time it wants to deploy a new software capability.” (CHIPS 2018) The 
difference between C2C24 and this project is NAVWARSYSCOM does not work on CS 
upgrades, so it is not applicable for the NSWC PHD need.  
2. Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise and Services  
“The CANES program is being developed to address the issues of the legacy 
shipboard network situation.” (Rognlie 2010, 8) The stated goals of the CANES program 
are:  
• “build a secure afloat network required for Naval and Joint operations” 
• “consolidate and reduce the number of afloat networks through the use of 
mature cross-domain technologies and Common Computing Environment 
(CCE) infrastructure” 
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• “reduce the infrastructure footprint and associated costs for hardware 
afloat”  
• “provide increased reliability, application hosting, and other capabilities to 
meet current and projected Warfighter requirements”  
• “Federated Net-Centric Enterprise Service (NCES) Afloat Core Services 
(ACS) to the tactical edge to support overall DOD Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) applications migration to a Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) environment” (Rognlie 2010, 8) 
3. Risk Management Framework  
“The DOD RMF describes the DOD process for identifying, implementing, 
assessing, and managing cybersecurity capabilities and services, expressed as security 
controls, and authorizing the operation of Information Systems (IS) and Platform 
Information Technology (PIT) systems” (AcqNotes 2020). One of the main objectives of 
the RMF process is to incorporate cybersecurity into the development process as early as 
possible and to enforce that cybersecurity is addressed throughout the project stages. For 
systems that are accredited, there are mandatory monthly scans for the systems to ensure 
there is timely corrections of the vulnerabilities. 
When the DOD has a new IA system, or a system that has had an upgrade, the 
system must be scanned for cyber vulnerabilities per the RMF process. Before the system 
is scanned for the cyber vulnerabilities, system owners must implement a predetermined 
list of Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) to the system. An example of a 
STIG is to ensure there is a DOD warning banner when the system is first turned on with 
an acknowledge button for the user to click. Once the STIGs are implemented, the system 
is scanned with a software tool to ensure the STIGs have been met. If the STIG cannot be 
met because it will hinder the system from performing its job, the system owner can write 
a statement explaining why the STIG cannot be met. The scans and explanations are sent 
to RMF accreditors, and they review the findings. If there are issues, it goes back to the 
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system owners for adjudication. Every time a new software load is installed to the system, 
the system will need to be scanned and re-certified. It is anticipated that major software 
updates will be installed prior to each deployment and shall receive bi-annual updates for 
minor software changes.  
4. Integrated Battle Command System 
Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) is a networked and integrated system 
of sensors, shooters, and mission command like the U.S. Navy’s Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC). The IBCS program provides one solution to the DOD’s requirement for 
an adaptable joint fire control and sensor platform. The IBCS has the capability to provide 
updates in a multi-domain environment. The IBCS system does not transfer software 
updates but is a system of integrated systems that share information through secure 
channels. This network of systems is a set of communication lines between multiple radars, 
mission commands, and launch platforms so that multiple shooters can see beyond line of 
sight, all track numerous targets, and determine which shooter is optimal for engagement. 
This system communication has framework established that could serve as an outline for 
this effort.  
5. Operation and Maintenance Center  
The Operation and Maintenance Center (OMC) is defined as the specified location 
that uses minicomputers or personal computers to monitor multiple terminals and transmits 
data to different equipment terminals through a communication network (Dai 2010). Along 
with equipment terminals, the OMC is an embedded system that monitors and remotely 
pushes software updates to equipment when necessary. This process utilizes flags and 
upgrade states to indicate whether a packet is successfully delivered. In this system, 
however, the packet will still be available in the network, which will be something the team 
will need to consider when design this system since the team’s data may contain sensitive 
information.  
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6. Operational Readiness Test System Tech Assist Remote Support  
Operational Readiness Test System Tech Assist Remote Support (ORTSTARS) is 
a shore-to-ship, remote access system to the Aegis CS. The system utilizes a network-
centric communication structure based on the Information Technology for the 21st Century 
(IT-21) tactical shipboard local area network (LAN), as well as the Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNet). This is a digital collaborative environment. After organizing a 
connection time via SIPRNet, sailors on board ships can communicate with on-shore 
personnel and discuss troubleshooting the system. Fault detection and fault isolation (FD/
FI) data undergo a bi-directional exchange in real time. The two main benefits of 
ORSTARS is the ability to distance support, and a method for rapid tech assist on demand. 
The ORTSTARS concept is based on the Navy’s Sea Power in the 21st Century (Sea Power 
21) strategic plan for building a surge-capable force. The hardware architecture is based on 
the “open-system architecture” and leverages commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
equipment.  
All current U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers have the capability of 
conducting distance support via the ORTSTARS system. The ORTSTARS physical 
connection is based on the SIPRNet IT-21 LAN and Ethernet Category 5 cables.  
7. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system “incorporates 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), human machine interface (HMI) workstations and 
network communication systems into a complete integrated system” (McCrady 2013, 1). 
By utilizing user-defined data values, logic operations can be programmed into the system. 
This allows programmers to set flags for any variable of the stakeholder’s interest. The 
SCADA system utilizes these logic controllers in conjunction with HMI workstations, and 
the network allows users to communicate with the system from an onsite workstation or a 
remote site assuming the remote site has access to the network. In previous projects, 
SCADA has been used to monitor the status of power plant operations.  
McCrady provides very detailed explanation of the SCADA software in his book 
with architecture examples showing how the SCADA system operates and emphasizing 
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the importance of documentation for software systems. For this project, the elements of the 
SCADA system will serve as a good reference to the type of system the team will 
incorporate into current existing systems.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature review was conducted in order to scope the problem of this project 
and to help identify potential solutions. The research was conducted on networks currently 
onboard ships, remote software upgrade capabilities, RMF, and other projects or 
companies that are achieving similar goals and overcoming similar issues. This research 
helped us identify potential solutions, measures and ways to model the system. 
21 
IV. PROBLEM REFINEMENT 
This chapter will document problem refinement. First, needs analysis is discussed, 
then an overview of the CONOPs, the gap analysis which will cover the current system 
and the proposed system, and finally the requirements analysis. 
A. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Technology is evolving at a very fast pace, and there are increasing requirements 
to update CS onboard various Navy vessels (Moore 2019). If there were a way to push 
updated CS software or programs to the vessels at a rapid pace, numerous vessels could be 
updated in a very short amount of time. NSWC PHD needs to have a process to deliver 
new software capability to ship CS and support the certification of the CS for use after the 
software installation. 
Due to the aggressive schedules and urgency to update CS software when needed, 
a new streamlined process to push updates to the ship will be required. After a new software 
package has been developed, there is a need to reduce the amount of deploy the software 
to the ship to obtain necessary CS certifications. Additionally, there is a need quickly verify 
the current afloat configurations installed on board. From these two main needs, a 
streamline process can be generated which will reduce the overall update and certification 
time frame throughout the fleet. 
The current software upgrade delivery process requires the installation team to 
schedule a tentative timeline with the ship crew to hand deliver and install software. The 
software installation team waits for ships to return to port. During this time, the team travels 
to the port, checks in with the port’s RMMCO, and goes onboard with the physical media 
to perform the update. The proposed process will eliminate the sending personnel to install 
the media with the ability to remotely deploy or update software upon return to port and a 
monitoring system showing the software version for each ship. 
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B. CONOPS 
The remote deployment process for updating CS software is intended to speed up 
the process of delivering adaptation data to the ship and receive CS certifications. After the 
software development team finishes the software package, the software is sent to a remote 
ground facility. The remote ground facility is intended to be a station where the software 
can be pushed to their respective ships without an installation team coming onboard. 
Instead, ship’s force in charge of CS will be notified of the software push, following 
procedures to acquire the software package and update CS. After software installation, the 
ship conducts tests and evaluations to acquire certifications from an approval authority. 
Certifications are reported back to the remote ground facility, which can be accessed at any 
point. A graphical view of the operational concept is show in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. CONOPS Graphic 
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Figure 7 shows the SysML structure diagram for the CONOPS. The software 
development team is shown in the software generation block. The software will then be 
transferred to the remote facility, which contains a main computer which stores the 
software and communication equipment. The communication equipment will 
communicate with the hardware of the software deployment system, linking the ship’s 
communication system and the remote facility. After link is established, the software is 
then transmitted to the ship into the ship’s main computer where the software can be 
installed into the CS. The CS is assumed to be within the ship block. 
 
Figure 7. CONOPS SysML Diagram 
C. GAP ANALYSIS 
The software delivery system under analysis for use by the NSWC PHD is designed 
to be a means to get software updates to ships while away from port. The updates will be 
sent from a land-based station at NSWC PHD via remote communications to the intended 
ship or fleet of ships. The reason for this development is to keep on-board CS software 
current and protected from vulnerability in potentially hostile environments. Initially the 
objective of this system is to update and maintain Aegis destroyers with basic or minor 
software updates and successfully maintain fleet software compliance while in deployed 
status.  
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1. Current System  
Currently NSWC PHD has no remote software update capability. The only method 
that is available for NSWC PHD to be able to push updates to Aegis destroyers is to 
perform updates while the ship is in port. This action is performed by physically carrying 
a compact disk (CD) on-board and loading the update directly to the system. Alternately, 
the same action can be performed while the ship is at sea but requires a person to be 
transported to the ship while at sea. The first scenario only happens every 12–18 months 
when the ship(s) pull into port. This poses a significant risk to the ships because of the 
vulnerability of the ship to cyber threats (and other means of electronic warfare (EW)) 
when in potentially hostile regions or situations. The second scenario can occur at a reduced 
interval time, but still comes with significant risk. Depending on the location of the ship  
at time of need for update, the risk of transportation of personnel (civilian or military) can 
be extremely high. Both of these situations carry significant risk to life and ship, but also 
carry a high logistics burden. The cost of performing either of these scenarios is high, 
especially considering the infrastructure is already in-place to be able to perform the  
remote deployment.  
2. Proposed System: Remote Deployment System 
The proposed system for NSWC PHD to update software for CS on deployed ships 
would eliminate the need for the direct touch aspect to the update; or at least removing the 
requirement for someone to travel to the physical ship. In this process, the update would 
take place by remotely pushing the update from a central location at NSWC PHD. This 
update would be most comparable to the update that a cell phone receives from a cellular 
provider. The update would be developed and vetted similar to the current process, but in 
this process the hand-over to the ship would be performed via satellite or through some 
type of untethered communication method. The update would be accepted and completed 
by an appointed person on the ship. The primary objective for this software update system 
is to be able to provide critical software updates to Aegis CS that could be vital to system 
performance during stressing times. There are, of course, other objectives for having the 
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ability to be able to push updates more frequently and easily, but for because of project 
constraints only system performance is considered.  
D. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS  
This section describes the different requirements for the RDS. This section 
describes the requirements in order to meet the need to efficiently deliver CS software to 
the ships. 
1. System Requirements 
System requirements were based upon the vision owner’s interpretation of the 
requirements. The literature review and research also ensured we considered sets of 
requirements (Buede 2000). The requirements were partitioned from the stakeholder 
requirements to include functional, non-functional, constraint and interface requirements.  
2. Stakeholder Requirements.  
The stakeholder requirements are to deliver CS software to the ship after new 
software data is required. The CS software shall successfully install the correct software 
into the CS. The CS software shall be validated and verified that the data in the software is 
correct. The version of the CS software shall be tracked and recorded for traceability. 
3. Functional Requirements 
This section of the report will outline and itemize the “shall” aspects of the 
proposed system. The foundation of the functional requirements is a mixture of stakeholder 
needs and vision owner subject matter expertise. These requirements are a top-level 
description of the CS software and its interaction with the Aegis destroyer.  
• The system shall be designed for updating CS software on an Aegis 
destroyer. 
• The system shall be designed to support multiple future CS elements that 
would require software updates to reduce total ownership cost. 
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• The CS elements shall receive major software updates prior to 
deployment, and shall receive bi-annual updates for minor updates. 
• The ship systems shall receive updates when ship is not under distress/any 
type of battle mode. 
• The boundary of the designed system shall not include the certifying 
organizations. 
The functional requirements model in SysML is shown in Figure 8. The top block 
represents the overall requirement to deploy CS updates to the ship. This requirement is 
refined to five child requirements shown in the next level. These requirements include a 
subsystem that needs to deliver the updates, a subsystem to receive the updates, a 
subsystem that tracks configuration of the CS software, and a subsystem that maintains 
records and documentation of accreditation. The lower tiers shown in the SysML diagram 
refine the child requirements to further define when CS software will be delivered and how 
software updates and tracked. 
 
Figure 8. Functional Requirements in SysML 
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4. Non-functional Requirements 
Non-functional requirements describe the “ilities” of the proposed system. These 
requirements define system attributes such as security, reliability, performance, 
maintainability, scalability, and usability and are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Non-functional Requirements in SysML 
a. Performance  
In Figure 10, the Performance Diagram for the RDS is shown. The vision owner 
has defined a threshold value of performance for the RDS that it be able to update 80% of 
the available fleet at the same point in time by sustaining a minimum bandwidth of 1.00 
Megabits per second (Mbps) from the start of the update until 30 minutes after initiation. 
The RDS must be able to connect and transmit regardless of sea conditions, environment, 
and force conditions. In order to preserve satellite communication (SATCOM) bandwidth 
during critical situations, the Aegis destroyer CONOPs will determine whether the update 
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will be accepted or deferred. If the ship personnel defer the software update, the deferment 
will expire after 30 days, and the RDS will automatically re-engage the ship for acceptance 
or deferral again. If operational conditions allow, ship personnel also have the option to 
perform a manual download request before the 30 days deferral has expired. 
 
Figure 10. Performance Diagram 
The system shall allow for interrupted connectivity when transmitting files to or 
from the ship. The system will resume transmission from point of disruption. In order to 
track fleet updates status, the system shall report the percentage of ships that have 
successfully executed the update(s). Additionally, the system will track the amount of time 
that it takes for the update to complete once initiated. The software update system shall 
contain code that directs the upload to the specific and required location, so that the user 
will not be required to perform any action other than what has been described in this 
subsection of the document. The software update system must be able to utilize and 
communicate with both military and commercial satellites and other types of network 
communication systems. 
b. Supportability.  
The RDS shall use COTS parts in order to simplify the supportability requirements 
during the system life cycle. The COTS design must be comprised of non-proprietary 
hardware and software. This construct will allow for trained technicians to perform repairs 
on ship-based system while deployed. Additionally, the COTS-based architecture will 
29 
allow for expansion of the remote software update system. Expansions will allow for 
additional CS to be integrated into the proposed system, thus reducing life cycle costs of 
the system and logistics burden of the U.S. Naval fleet. The performance requirement for 
the software update system to be able to utilize and communicate with both military and 
commercial satellites, and other types of network communication systems is to expand the 
usable amount of satellite systems for increased supportability to the system functionality 
(Blanchard 2011). 
c. Usability
The graphical user interface (GUI) shall allow for minimal training to be required 
so that multiple people (land-based and ship-based) are able to perform basic actions 
required for the update to be performed. The upload of files to be transferred out must be 
designed and executed by certified technicians to preclude the possibility of improper file 
transfer. The update ship-based GUI shall be designed to be “Accept/Postpone” along with 
“OK” to confirm completion or postponement of update. This will be required in order to 
make update ‘clear and simple’ in the event that the fleet or vessel is in stressing 
environment so that user is certain of action and status (Cohen 2014). 
d. Reliability
The system shall maintain connection from start to completion of update. If 
connection is broken, slowed below specified performance, or stopped, the update must 
recognize point of disruption and resume at that point. As an example, the update must be 
completed within three minutes for basic updates (below 15 Mb), seven minutes (between 
15 and 20 Mb), and within ten minutes (>20 Mb). Larger file size transfers must be 
scheduled and only executed while connected through a SATCOM system to verify ability 
to transfer and accept. If transmission is broken during the prescribed time allotments, the 
transmission log will be referenced by the CS software and resume at that point (Cohen 
2014). 
e. Interface
The derived interface requirements specify that the system shall have: 
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1. Wireless data interface between the NSWC PHD shore facilities to a
communication satellite.
2. Wireless data interface between the communication satellite and the Navy
ships.
3. LAN interface from the ship’s wireless receiver unit to a software
management system/database.
4. LAN interface from software management system/database to the ship’s
CS.
f. Legal
All DOD regulations and rules will be adhered to in the design and implementation 
of the system and the transfer of the files. File transfer will not be performed on unverified 
and unsecure networks. All transfers must adhere to military regulations that specify rules 
and governances for electronic file transfer and uploads. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
 This chapter described problem refinement to include needs analysis, the CONOPs,
the gap analysis for both the current and proposed systems, and finally the requirements 
analysis. This analysis will be used for determining the best alternative for delivery of CS 
software. The alternatives analysis can be linked to the requirements analysis for 
traceability and V&V. 
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V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter includes the models and analysis of the system of interest. The models 
were used to analyze the various methods to deliver CS software to the ship. The SysML 
diagrams show the system architecture, structure and the functional flow. These diagrams 
trace the requirements to ensure the system meets the needs of the stakeholders. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology is based on the CONOPS diagram. The RDS is modeled with the 
remote station, servers, ships, and the communication link between them. The most 
efficient way to model the system would be to match the components on the ships. Since 
ships will not be getting a hardware change, the system in design must be made to 
accommodate the current technology on the ships.  
The model starts with the ship block or components on the ship, and this can include 
communication equipment, storage servers, main computer and CS computer. The ship’s 
main computer will receive an alert notification from the remote station server informing 
that a CS update is ready for download and install. The remote station will receive status 
updates regarding the download and installation of the software. The final notification will 
be for a successful installation.  
The remote station will consist of the main computer where the software will get 
uploaded to the servers and become available for the ships to download. The remote station 
will consist of communication equipment that will allow it to connect to the ship’s network. 
The remote station will also consist of another set of servers that will record all the software 
version configuration of the ships. 
1. System Models  
The system modeling methodology followed the modeling taxonomy adopted from 
the Practical Guide to SysML by Friedenthal, Moore, and Steiner (2015). The SysML 
diagrams follow the structure and behavior diagrams as identified in Figure 11. The models 
and diagrams are created in Cameo Enterprise Architecture software. For this project, the 
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major diagrams for the SysML model used are the structure diagrams, the behavior 
diagrams, and the requirements diagram. The structure of the RDS is defined in BDDs and 
IBDs. The structure diagrams show the components of the systems or subsystems and the 
interfaces between them to fulfil requirements. The behavior diagrams show describes the 
means of how the system will interface with other systems or subsystems. For this project, 
the behavior diagrams will describe how requests are transmitted, how software data is 
moved, and how confirmation receipts are received. These diagrams are traced back to the 
requirements diagram to ensure that all requirements are satisfied and verifiable. 
 
Figure 11. RDS System Models Including Behavior and 
Structure Diagrams 
2. State Machine Diagram 
The state machine diagram shown in Figure 12 displays the various actions that 
take place as part of the software update function and it is followed up with the software 
version check function. The actions of the left are for the software update function and the 
actions on the right are for software version check. If a software update is required, the 
state machine follows the left path. Upon successful installation of the software, the state 
transitions to the software version check. If a software update is not required but there is a 
33 
request to check the current software version installed on the ship, the path on the right 
would be chosen where the software version is verified without installation of new data. 
 
Figure 12. State Machine Diagram for the Software Update Process 
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3. System Boundary Model 
The system boundary model shown in Figure 13 shows the boundary of the 
deployment system. External to the deployment system is the software generation and the 
CS certification. The software generators are involved in compiling and delivering the 
software to remote ground station where it enters the boundary of our system. The system 
exits the boundary into CS certification where the software is validated and verified by the 
RMF accreditation team. 
 
Figure 13. System Boundary Model 
4. Use Case 
The UC diagram shown in Figure 14 shows how three different groups of users will 
interact with the RDS to perform the actions. The UC starts with NSWC PHD receiving 
new CS software from the software developers. The operator at the remote station will 
input the software into the main computer and initiate upload to the local servers first after 
a virus scan is conducted on the software. The local servers will receive and host the 
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software for all the ships. The user can also initiate a software version check for the 
installed software on a ship. Afterwards, the ship will receive a notification of new software 
availability. Ship personnel will initiate software installation and wait for it to finish. Once 
the installation is successful, a notification will be sent to NSWC PHD informing the 
personnel that the installation was successful. The user at NSWC PHD will relay this 
information to the RMF accreditor, who will begin the accreditation process and certify the 
ship to operate with the new software. NSWC PHD will be notified after the CS has been 
certified for use. 
 
Figure 14. UC Diagram of the RDS 
5. Action Diagrams 
SysML diagrams were used to assist in building the architecture for this project. 
State machine and UC diagrams were shown in the earlier sections. In the AoA section, 
BDDs and IBDs are used to show the relevant blocks and the flow of information between 
them. 
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B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
The system will be capable of performing two main tasks as shown in Figure 15: 
software update and software version check. The software update function of the system 
will be conducted using the main computer interfacing with the ship’s network and 
transferring files. Ship personnel will have the option to install the new software update as 
soon as it is available or later. The software version check function can be executed from 
the main computer of the system and will send a query through the communication network 
to each ship. The ship will return the query with the current software version information. 
This information will be provided to CM teams at NSWC PHD to ensure each ship has the 
correct software version installed. A sample of the CMP is shown in Appendix A. This 
plan will define the organizations involved, their roles in the system, and how to properly 
check and document current configuration onboard each ship. 
 
Figure 15. Functional Block Diagram Hierarchy 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the modeling methodology used for the project’s SysML 
models and the architecture. The chapter explained the boundaries of the system and what 
external systems interact with the RDS system. The state machine, UC, and functional 
analysis diagrams show how the system will operate. These models will be used for the 
AoA to determine the best solution that fits the need. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This chapter describes the different alternatives for deploying a software package 
to the ship. These solutions are different from the current process of hand carrying the 
package to the ship for installation. Each alternative will be scored based on the value 
model. For this analysis, the software will only be installed when a ship is in-port as it will 
affect the CS availability; therefore, it is crucial to conduct updates only when in-port. 
A. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
1. Satellite (in port) 
Figure 16 shows BDD of the RDS using SATCOM. The BDD expresses 
information about the system’s structure (Delligatti 2014). The main computer in the 
remote station will receive software package from the software generators. Afterwards, the 
new software package will get pushed to the remote station communicating using the data 
transfer interface. The remote station communication will be used to host the new software 
for all the ships to download. SATCOM will be used to transfer the files to the ships. The 
ships will have an option to utilize the wired Ethernet cable while in-port to assist with the 
CS software updates as backup if available. The ship will manually confirm the download 
and allow installation. Upon successful installation, the ships will send the latest version 
number back to the main computer at NSWC PHD. 
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Figure 16. BDD for Satellite Alternative 
Figure 17 shows the IBD for the Satellite Alternative. The update of the CS with 
the new software starts when a user manually inputs the software into the main computer 
using the CD drive. The main computer will read and upload the data to the remote station 
communication using data ports or LAN ports. The remote station communications will 
relay data to and from the internet using LAN ports as well. The internet block here serves 
as a pathway to connect various ships to the same network and also as a host of the files, 
in case there is a technical problem at the remote station. The ship’s communication 
equipment will use satellites to download the software and move it to the ship’s main 
computer for installation. Once installation is complete, the ship’s main computer will send 
a notification back to the remote station indicating a successful installation. This IBD 
shows a two-way path between the remote station and the ships to ensure complete 
information can be relayed between the platforms. 
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Figure 17. IBD for Satellite Alternative 
2. Proximity Radio Frequency Link (in port) 
Figure 18 shows the BDD for the proximity radio frequency (RF) link. This option 
will utilize line-of-sight radio to transfer data from the remote station to the nearby ships. 
The main computer in the remote station will receive a software package from the software 
generators. Afterwards, the new software package will get pushed to the remote station 
communicating using the data transfer interface. The remote station communication will 
interface with the proximity radio equipment. This requires line of sight for stable 
communication. The proximity radio equipment will be used to push files to all the ships 
that can access it. The ship will manually confirm the download and allow installation. 
Upon successful installation, the ships will send the latest version number back to the main 
computer at NSWC PHD. 
40 
 
Figure 18. BDD for Proximity Radio Alternative 
Figure 19 shows the IBD for the proximity RF alternative. The software installation 
starts when a user manually inputs the software into the main computer using the CD-drive. 
The main computer will read and upload the data to the Remote Station Communication 
using data ports or LAN ports. The remote station communications will relay data to and 
from the ships using RF transmitting and receiving equipment. The ship’s communication 
equipment will interface with RF receivers and transmitters to download the software and 
move it to the ship’s main computer for installation. Once installation is complete, the 
ship’s main computer will send a notification back to the remote station indicating a 
successful installation. This IBD shows a two-way path between the remote station and the 




Figure 19. IBD for Radio Alternative 
B. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
To determine the feasibility of using the RDS instead of the current method, a 
decision model was created. The decision model included a value model to help determine 
which alternative would be the best solution for NSWC PHD. The value model included a 
value hierarchy and expected relative system performance scores and weights in order to 
determine a total value score. The decision model is an additive value model and assumes 
the measures are preferentially independent. (Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson 2011) 
Figure 20 shows the value hierarchy. The value hierarchy diagram shows the relationships 
between the effective need and evaluation measures for analysis. The effective need is to 
deliver software updates to the ships. The objectives are to maintain bandwidth, have a low 
number of operators to execute the software installation, and to have a minimal amount of 
time to setup and complete the installation. 
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Figure 20. Value Hierarchy 
The two alternatives are the current system of physically sending a team to the ship 
to install the software, and using a RDS. Three main objectives from the stakeholder are 
(1) minimize the number of personnel it takes to perform the software upgrade to the CS, 
(2) maximize the reliability of the system while the ship is in port, and (3) minimize the 
time needed to perform the upgrade. If there is a reduction in the number of personnel 
required, that means the cost of the installation will also go down. If the installation can be 
performed remotely, that saves on the number of people required and it saves on travel 
costs. The most important objective is the reliability of the method. If the method is not 
reliable, then it is not worthwhile to pursue. The current system is more reliable than the 
RDS because there are no issues with connectivity to the ship since a team physically with 
the upgrade will be onboard to not only perform the installation, but also troubleshoot any 
issues that may arise. Saving time is always a goal of the PO, especially if it means they 
can ensure the fleet is secure and upgraded in a timely manner before an issue arises. The 
RDS is a much faster process than the current system since there is no travel or coordination 
time with a team to go to the ship. Instead everything can be arranged virtually, and the 
ship can perform the installation when they have the most time, even if it is at night when 
most installation teams would not be onboard.  
43 
Table 1 shows a decision model matrix for alternative system selection. A relative 
expected system performance score was assigned to show how each objective is met by 
each alternative. The highest scoring alternative would have the most value to the 
command to implement. The criterion weights were based off of priorities expressed by 
the vision owner. The higher the priority, the higher the criterion weight. The “alternative 
selection data” was calculated differently depending on the category. For example, the 
“number of personnel required” has more value when fewer people are required. So the 
RDS has a higher value than the current system. For the reliability of the system, the more 
reliable it is, the more value it has to the command. Since the current system would not 
have to worry about interference or interruptions, it received a higher score than the RDS. 
However, as you will see though the modeling in the next section, the RDS was relatively 
reliable as well. The “sum scores of alternatives” was calculated by multiplying the 
criterion weight by the “alternative selection data” value. These values were then summed 
to provide a total value score for each alternative. The higher the score, the more value 
there is to the program. 
Table 1. Decision Model for Alternative System Selection 
 Alternative Selection 
Data Sum Scores of Alternatives 





# of personnel required 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.04 0.10 
Reliability 
(Interference/Interruptions) 
0.5 0.5 0.4 0.25 0.20 
Time Required 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.06 0.18 
 0.35 0.48 
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After performing the analysis with the criterion weights, it shows that the RDS is 
the preferred system. Now we need to determine which of the candidate RDS solutions to 
recommend through Monte Carlo simulations. 
C. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
1. Design of the Monte Carlo Simulation for the RDS 
To determine expected system performance for the solutions alternatives, a Monte 
Carlo Simulation was created. Table 2 shows the different factors for the Monte Carlo 
analysis. The data transfer speed is dependent on the amount of bandwidth between the 
remote deployment station communication equipment, the communication system, and the 
ship’s communication equipment. The software file size can vary to a small file to a 
relatively large file. Additionally, interference and interruptions will need to be handled by 
each alternative. The Monte Carlo simulation setup is described in Appendix C. 
Table 2. Parameters Used in Monte Carlo Setup 
Factor Low Medium High 
Transfer Speed 0.1 Mbps 5 Mbps 15 Mbps 
Software File Size 1 MB 500 MB 1 GB 
Interference/Interruptions None Some Many 
 
 
2. Simulation Results 
The Monte Carlo analysis was conducted using the Innoslate software for 
measuring the average download times for the speeds shown in Table 2. An action diagram 
was created to map out the download process and the data speeds and file size were chosen 
at random. The results are shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22.  
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Figure 21. Monte Carlo Simulation Results for 500 Runs 
 
Figure 22. Monte Carlo Results Time Bar Chart 
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Figure 23 shows the numerical results. There were a total of 500 runs conducted 
and in 327 runs, the download time was less than a minute. There were 60 runs that took 
between one to 19 minutes, 52 runs that took between 37 to 55 minutes, and 61 runs that 
took around two hours. This data shows that majority of the download times will be less 
than two hours but there will be instances where it takes two hours to download. As 
expected, the one Mbps speed combined with the one gigabyte (GB) file was the slowest 
with around 2.4 hours. The one Mbps speed was chosen to represent a low bandwidth 
availability scenario, five Mbps for medium bandwidth, and 15 for high bandwidth 
availability scenario. This test helps us confirm our expectations and allows us to better 
design the system with large files being transferred over low bandwidth scenarios. 
 
Figure 23. Monte Carlo Results Download Times 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the different alternatives for the RDS system. The analysis 
scenario is while the ship is in-port in non-battle conditions. A feasibility analysis 
determined that the RDS would perform better than the current system. In order to 
recommend a conceptual solution, an AoA was conducted using Monte Carlo simulation 
in Innoslate. Cost analysis will need to be conducted outside of this paper for future work. 
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VII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the major findings and results that support the project 
objectives. It also includes additional insights that emerged and recommendations for 
future work. 
The project objective was to demonstrate a process that would support common CS 
incremental capability software updates that is faster than today’s process. The project 
deliverables included a feasibility analysis, a CONOPs diagram for this process (which was 
shown in Figure 6), and a CMP. The CMP is described in Appendix A. Initial system risks 
were are identified and are described in Appendix B. 
A. RESULTS 
The first section of the results covers the RDS model and the process to efficiently 
deliver CS software and the process for determining CS software configuration and 
obtaining the evidence needed for certification. The second section covers the Monte Carlo 
simulation results based on the models showing the feasibility of using this system which 
is faster than today’s methods. 
1. RDS Model 
The need for a more effective solution for delivering CS software updates to the 
ship began from the understanding of the constraints of the current system. The current 
system of physically delivering software encounters scheduling and resource limitations 
based on availability from both the software delivery team and the ship. The RDS modeling 
demonstrated a means for transmitting software packages in a more effective parallel 
process that reduces the number of personnel required for each software update. However, 
the RDS system will require relying on secure network communications between the 
remote facility and the ship.  
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2. Monte Carlo Simulation 
From the Monte Carlo simulation, the time to transmit the software update from the 
remote facility to the ship has a mean of 33 minutes and the standard deviation of 46 
minutes. From these results, it appears that the ship will download the software update 
from the remote site in a time period between less than a minute and an hour and 19 minutes 
68% of the time. The longest download time based on the estimated parameters is about 
two hours. These parameters were set based on estimated software size and transfer speed. 
Under operational conditions, the download time may differ based on exact software 
package size and allowed bandwidth during transmission. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendations Based on the Current Work 
Based on the findings from the modeling and simulation, deploying CS software 
from remote locations would reduce the amount of time and resources used to schedule 
time with the ship and sending personnel to install CS updates. The RDS would provide a 
faster response time if software updates require an expedited delivery. Demonstrated 
through modeling and simulation, the RDS has the potential of sending CS packages 
without scheduling personnel to travel to install packages.  
2. Recommendations for Future Work 
Elements outside the scope of this paper include CS package file size, bandwidth 
of ship’s network, and communication links between remote facility networks and ship 
networks, reducing total ownership cost, and addressing DISA concerns. Further analysis 
on these aspects will produce a more refined estimate of transmission time using the Monte 
Carlo method. Based on the literature review, the C2C24 program allows a means to 
connect to the ship’s network. In addition to the models and simulations found in this paper, 
remote deployment programs can be explored further 
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APPENDIX A.  CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this appendix is to outline the CMP regarding the RDS. The CM 
process will establish and maintain the consistency of system performance despite 
inconsistencies of circumstances that may occur throughout the life cycle (software 
changes, parts obsolescence, etc.) 
Key goals of CM include: 
• Identification and documentation of hardware and software elements of 
the system 
• Traceability of the elements to the design and requirements 
• Tracking and verification of changes made to the system throughout the 
life cycle 
• Auditing and tracking the configuration or the baseline of the fielded 
systems 
• Assuring supportability throughout the life cycle of the system 
To achieve these goals, the baseline and a database are usually established to 
facilitate traceability and control. The CM approach in this appendix is based on CM 
Guidance (MIL-HDBK-61) and CM Standard Implementation Guide (SAE-GEIA-HB-
649). The DoDI 5000.02 “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework” also states 
that a CMP should be included in the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP). 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of a CMP is to document the changes made and provide configuration 
identification, change control and configuration audits.  
• The CMP plan will define: 
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• Baselining configuration items (CI) 
• Method of controlling modification of CI 
• Reporting and recording of modification of CI 
• Ensuring the correctness of CI thru audits 
• Methods of storage, handling and delivering of data pertaining to CI 
C. APPROACH 
Due to the nature of software updates, the methods of controlling, reporting, 
recording auditing and data storage will be largely done in electronics format. Use of 
database accessible via the network is encouraged. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The NSWC PHD shore facility should be the main actor in the CMP 
implementation. NSWC PHD should also have direct control over the database for CM.  
E. TRAINING 
Training should be provided to both NSWC PHD and ship personnel, regarding the 





APPENDIX B.  RISK ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the risk analysis for the RDS. The risk analysis will be 
limited to the technical aspect only, as cost information is not of the scope of this study and 
can be a future subject. The risk analysis approach is based on process set forth by system 
engineering textbooks (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011) and several DOD risk management 
guides (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics 2006) (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems 
Engineering 2017).  
A. THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Risk is inherent to any engineering and program effort. The purpose of this section
is to objectively present the identification and analysis on the risks associated with the 
RDS. The risk management process will be based on methodology presented in classical 
system engineering textbooks, such as the “System Engineering and Analysis” by 
Blanchard and Fabrycky, and on guidelines set forth by the “2006 Risk Management Guide 
for DOD Acquisition.” 
Blanchard and Fabrycky describe the four basic categories of risk: technical risk, 
cost risk, schedule risk and programmatic risk. For the purpose of this capstone, the main 
focus will be on the technical risks.  
Risk management is an iterative process that is accomplished throughout the system 
engineering process. Blanchard and Fabrycky describe this process as follows (Blanchard 
and Fabrycky 2011, 692):  
• Risk Planning - Includes the development of a risk management plan or
a given program.
• Risk Identification - Includes the screening of all requirements and to
identify those are likely not to be met. This capstone report will be focus
on the technical risk indentation portion of this process.
• Risk Assessment - Pertains to determining the probability of failure to
meet a specified requirement and the possible outcome and
consequences of not meeting the requirement. This pertains to both the
probability of occurrence and the estimated magnitude of the risk.
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• Risk analysis - is accomplished to determine the options in which the
risk can be eliminated or minimized.
• Risk handling - includes the activities associated with the incorporation
of changes and system modification of product or process.
The capstone will also utilize the Risk Management Process defined by the DOD 
Risk Management Guidelines. The Risk Management Process uses the five key activities 
shown in Figure 24. 
Figure 24. DOD Risk Management Process. Adapted from Office of 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (2006). 
For the scope of this capstone, the risk management will be focus on the Risk 
Identification, Risk Analysis and Risk Mitigation Planning. 
The 2006 Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition defines risk as “the 
measure of future uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives 
within defined cost, schedule and performance constraints.” The guide defines three 
components of risk as follows: 
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1. A root cause, which, if eliminated or corrected, would prevent a
potential consequence from occurring
2. A probability (or likelihood) assessed at the present time of the root
cause occurring
3. The consequence of that root cause occurrence
The probability of the root cause occurring can be quantified as numeric Risk 
Levels which facilitates the use of a risk matrix during risk analysis process. There are 
different ways of quantifying risk probability, but for this project, the team will use the 
2006 Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, which provides a five-level 
probability quantification. 
Table 3. Levels of Risk Occurrence. Source: Office of the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2006). 
The consequences are also quantified with five levels in the DOD Risk Management 
Guide with the five levels of consequence for technical performance shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Levels of Risk Consequences. Source: Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (2006). 
 
 
B. RISK IDENTIFICATION 
1. Risk 1—Technical Maturity of RDS 
The key technical aspects of the RDS, are the satellite network, network security, 
the data transmission format and associated error correction, and database manage and the 
integration of the whole system. All are implemented currently in the military and 
commercial sectors in some way. The associated probability of technical maturity issues is 
low. The consequences of such issue occurrence will not be negligible, but mitigation 
methods should be available either within the military or commercial industry. The level 
of risk occurrence should be low (1) and the consequence of risk is low to medium (2). 
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2. Risk 2—Stability of Connection and Correctness of Software Downloads
Several factors negatively impact the stability of connection of this system. Satellite
connection is inherently less stable compared to land-based connection. A User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) connection is inherently less stable than a Transmission Control protocol 
(TCP) connection, and ship is an unstable platform that can be operating in adverse weather 
conditions. The instability of connections not only increases the time needed to complete 
the download, but it may create associated software error. This issue is addressed by error 
correction mechanisms for UDP protocols. The frequency of occurrence for the stability 
and correctness issue will be high (5), but there are matured error correction methods 
mitigating the correctness issue, so the consequence of this risk should be medium (3) 
overall. 
3. Risk 3—Network Security
Network security is a continuous and interactive process through the life cycle of
network system due to the nature of evolving threats. Attempts on trying to breach military 
related networks never cease, but with the implementation of careful network security 
measures, the probably of a successful breach should be low (1). Due to the sensitive and 
classified nature of CS codes, if a breach happened, the consequences would be severe (5). 
4. Risk 4—Training
Personnel training is always an integral part of any CS. The current process of CS
software updates is performed by specialists trained by NSWC PHD, and CS software 
upgrades are a significant part of their daily workload, but under the structure of the RDS, 
this responsibility will be shifted to the ship’s crew, and since CS upgrades are not going 
to be a daily task, adequate training of the associated procedures will be important. Fault-
proof designs in the upgrade system (i.e., avoid sailor deleting the current CS without 
complete download and installation of the new CS software) should render the overall risk 
occurrence low to medium (2), and the associated consequences should be low to medium 
also (2). 
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5. Risk 5—Integration Issues 
Remotely upgrading a CS will involve many sub-systems, with different 
manufacturers. Integration issues can potentially occur among the sub-systems. The risk 
for integration issues to occur should be medium (3), and the consequence of it should also 
be medium (3). 
C. RISK ANALYSIS 
With the above risk probably and consequences assignment, we can generate the 
risk matrix by mapping in the numeric values shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Risk Reporting Matrix 
Risk 2, Stability of Connection and Correctness of Software Downloads, and Risk 
3, Network Security, are the two risks that are closer to the high-risk area, and will need a 
well thought out RMP. 
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APPENDIX C. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION SETUP 
The Monte Carlo simulation activity diagram shown in Figure 26 for the speed 
and file size analysis was conducted using Innoslate. The diagram was setup to randomly 
pick the file transfer speed first, then it would randomly pick the file size. The transfer 
speeds are one Mbps, five Mbps, and 15 Mbps. The file sizes are 100 Megabytes (MB), 
500 MB, and one GB. The transfer time was determined by dividing the file size by the 
speed after bring converting the units for both into bits and bps using the binary 
method. The simulation would pick the speed first then the file size and show the number 
of times every combination of speed and size were selected. 
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Figure 26. Monte Carlo Action Diagram 
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